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Some historians have suggested that 
his age made him ineligible for the 
position of senior commander overseas.6 
Aged 53 in August 1914. he was still 
younger than the leader eventually 
selected, Major-General E.A.H. Alderson. 
The 55-year -o ld Alderson h a d 
considerable experience on active service, 
and had commanded Canadians in South 
Africa. Hughes preferred him over two other 
British officers he had considered (the 61-year-
old Earl of Dundonald, and the 69-year-old 
Major-General Reginald Pole Carew), and 
Kitchener approved the choice.7 The commander 
Hughes later selected to lead the 2nd Division, 
the famous Western Canadian Major-General 
Sam Steele, was ten years older than Alderson! 
Neither Lessard's age nor his rank prevented 
Sam Hughes from naming him to an overseas 
command. As Lessard also had experience 
commanding troops in South Africa (as did 
Steele), why was he not considered for a 
divisional command? 
Attempting to analyze the decision-making 
process under Sam Hughes is not easy. The 
considerations that lay behind each appointment 
could be very complex, or else very simple. 
Hughes sometimes could make non-biased 
appointments of outstanding individuals -
perhaps most notably Arthur Currie to command 
the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in 1914 - but 
being a friend of the Minister and a Conservative 
were often sufficient. Was Lessard a victim of this 
arbitrariness, or were there other reasons? A look 
at Lessard's military experience is necessary 
before reaching any conclusions. 
When Canada decided to contribute an expeditionary force to support 
the British in August 1914 a commander 
had to be named. While the Conservative 
Minister of Militia and Defence, Colonel 
Sam Hughes, thought that he himself 
might be the most appropriate leader of 
the 1st Canadian Division, the British 
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener, 
disagreed. As Hughes contemplated several other 
candidates, one officer he did not consider was 
Major-General François-Louis Lessard.1 
Lessard had strong supporters. He was "held 
by many to be the most accomplished officer in 
the Canadian Forces" in 1914, wrote Colonel A.F. 
Duguid, first h i s tor ian of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force.2 Premier J.P. Whitney of 
Ontario advised Prime Minister Robert Borden 
that "in my opinion Major-General Lessard 
should command the First Contingent...I think 
most people will agree with me that he is the one 
ou ts tand ing man for the position."3 J .F. 
Cummins, writing in the Canadian Defence 
Quarterly shortly after the First World War, 
suggested that Lessard had been the best 
candidate due to his age, rank, experience, 
efficiency and knowledge of both the francophone 
and anglophone military establishments.4 But, 
despite the protests of some of his supporters -
including the Chief of the General Staff Sir 
Willoughby Gwatkin5 - Lessard received no 
overseas command, not even a brigade. Instead, 
he was made Inspector-General for Eastern 
Canada. This was an important position, but it 
was certainly not the front-line command role 
hoped for by Lessard. 
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Lieutenant-Colonel F.-L Lessard at the time of the 
South African War. 
He acquired his first experience of active 
service during the North-West campaign in 1885. 
As the cavalry's role was limited to protecting 
supply lines, however, Lessard's group never 
came under fire, and their main battle was 
against boredom. An even greater battle against 
boredom was to be joined in 1893 when 
Lessard's cavalry corps, which had recently been 
renamed the Royal Canadian Dragoons, moved 
to Toronto. Promoted lieutenant-colonel to 
command the Dragoons in July 1899, Lessard 
received high praise from the Military Gazette 
for his enthusiasm and hard work.10 He was thus 
well placed to play an important role in the 
Canadian contingents that would soon sail to 
participate in the South African War. 
On 12 October 1899 forces from the Boer 
republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State invaded the British Cape Colony and Natal, 
helping London justify an anticipated war in the 
area. Ottawa had already been wrestling with the 
question of possible Canadian participation for 
weeks, and showed at least as much opposition 
as support for the idea. But once war was 
declared the Canadian government almost 
immediately announced a contribution of 1,000 
volunteers. Over 6,000 additional volunteers 
would join them during the following two and a 
half year struggle, mostly paid for by the British. 
The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 
emphasized his support for the empire's fight for 
humanity, religious freedom and civil rights -
such as securing the right to vote for the 
Uitlanders (disenfranchised subjects of the 
Crown living in the Boer colonies); but many 
critics suspected that London sought liberty only 
for white Anglo-Saxons,11 and was merely 
attempting to protect its economic interests in 
South African diamond and gold mines. 
Canadian support for the war was far from 
u n a n i m o u s , and non-ang lophones were 
understandably among the most hesitant. Had 
francophone opposition to the war been as fervent 
as some accounts claim, however, the support of 
someone like Lessard for the cause would be 
difficult to explain.12 In fact, it appears that 
support for the war in English Canada has often 
been exaggerated and support in French Canada 
Lessard was born in Quebec City on 9 
December 1860. His father, Louis L. Lessard, 
was Secretary with the Permanent Building 
Society, and François-Louis, known to his friends 
as Louis, attended St. Thomas's College. He 
served in a number of local militia units, and 
then joined "B" Battery of the Quebec Garrison 
Artillery as a gunner, and in which he became a 
second lieutenant in 1880. In 1884 he joined the 
Cavalry School Corps of the Permanent Force at 
Quebec, and was promoted captain in 1888. 
Although he had deep roots in the francophone 
community, like some of the francophone 
political, economic, and military leaders of the 
time - such as Sir Wilfrid Laurier and RMC 
graduates Percy Girouard and P.-H. D. Casgrain8 
- he was not entirely out of place among the 
British elite. Some soldiers under his command 
in South Africa thought they recognized a French 
accent when he spoke English, while others 
identified it as British!9 
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successfully for the unit to be known under this 
designation. Although some of the recent 
volunteers who now found themselves Dragoons 
considered the request "rather absurd,"19 the 
Brit ish were impressed, seeing Lesard 's 
persistence as a defence of the regimental system 
and a commitment to building the traditions that 
lay at its heart. 
Lessard was anxious to take his battalion into 
action when it arrived in South Africa, too 
anxious for the British who would have preferred 
a few more weeks of training. He nonetheless had 
his wish immediately, and led the Dragoons in 
operations in the Cape Colony, the Orange Free 
State, and the Transvaal. By the time his battalion 
left South Africa in December it had ridden 1,700 
miles and had fought 27 separate engagements, 
including an impressive victory at the battle of 
Coetzee's Drift in May.20 After fighting disease, 
the elements, and the enemy, many looked 
forward to the end of the war. But after the 
Transvaal's capital, Pretoria, fell in June, the role 
of mounted infantry became more important than 
ever, as the Boer mounted commandos adopted 
a guerrilla-style war. 
Horsemen were now essential for escort and 
reconnaissance duties, and to participate in 
raiding parties against Boer commandos. The 
task was not easy for the Dragoons, as the 
number of men and horses had fallen to less than 
half of the original strength. Some had been 
assigned new roles while others had been 
wounded or become ill.21 Lessard himself was 
injured in an accident and spent most of August 
recovering. After a battle at Witpoort Pass, he was 
returning to camp in the dark over rocky ground 
when his horse fell on him, spraining his thigh.22 
After his return he assumed command of 1,400 
hundred troops stationed in the town of Belfast, 
200 kilometers to the northeast of Pretoria. 
During his two weeks of command in mid-
October, Lessard reportedly adopted a more 
aggressive s tance than his predecessors , 
organizing and sending out a large number of 
expeditions into the surrounding countryside.23 
Despite occasional confrontations with Boer 
commandos, these fighting patrols, which 
Lessard commanded with skill , were 
characterized most often by monotonous 
routine.24 Days were long, nights were cold, and 
51 
underestimated.13 In the early months of the 
struggle La Presse and La Patrie both had 
articles critical of the British position, but they 
carried far more that were favourable. A leading 
opponent, Henri Bourassa, admitted privately 
that he could not understand why French-
Canadian views of imperialism remained 
"unsettled" and support for Laurier so high.14 The 
francophone religious, business, political, and 
military elites were strongly behind the cause, 
as long as the war remained not a fight for Anglo-
Saxon economic or political dominance, but a 
fight for humanity, religious freedom, and civil 
rights. This was the cause Laurier sought to 
emphasize,15 and it was this cause that Lessard 
intended to defend when he offered his services 
and encouraged his francophone compatriots to 
volunteer with him.16 
Lessard would be disappointed when, in 
accepting the Canadian offer of troops, Britain 
specified a preference for infantry over cavalry. 
With no hope of embarking with his own mounted 
regiment, Lessard volunteered for special service 
with the First Contingent, consisting entirely of 
infantry, which sailed at the end of October 1899. 
He shared a cabin with his old friend from 
Quebec, Oscar C. Pelletier. 17 After his arrival in 
South Africa Lessard joined the staff of the 
commander of the British cavalry, Sir John 
French, and he gained some valuable experience, 
most notably during the relief of Kimberley in 
February 1900. He would soon have the 
opportunity to put this to good use in command 
of his own Canadian mounted battalion. 
In December 1899, London accepted a 
second Canadian contingent. This left on three 
ships in January and February and consisted of 
two battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifles (750 
men), and three batteries of Royal Canadian Field 
Artillery (539 men). When they arrived in late 
March, Lessard assumed the command of the 
1st Battalion CMR, with the Westerner T.D.B. 
Evans as his second-in-command. The 2nd CMR 
was under the command of L.W. Herchmer, with 
Sam Steele as second-in-command, both from 
the North-West Mounted Police. However, Steele 
soon left to lead Strathcona's Horse, and Evans 
replaced Herchmer in May 1900.18 Another 
change was in the name of Lessard's unit. As its 
manpower nucleus of trained soldiers came from 
the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lessard argued 
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gun covered the withdrawal of the second, with 
the troops formed in a semi-circle on each side. 
Under increasing Boer pressure, Lessard had to 
evaluate when to use the guns to support the 
rearguard and when to retreat. At one point when 
the 12-pounders were threatened, Morrison 
remembered Lessard galloping up and shouting 
"for God's sake Morrison save your guns! They 
are coming down on our flanks."26 Eventually the 
gunners made good their withdrawal, thanks to 
the assistance of three Dragoons - Sergeant 
Edward Holland, who provided covering fire with 
his Colt machine gun,27 and Lieutenants H.Z.C. 
Cockburn and R.E.W. Turner who rushed to help 
stave off the off the Boer attackers. In the process, 
the leader of the Boer commando, commandant 
H.R. Prinsloo, and the commander of all Boer 
police actions applying the British "scorched 
earth" policy - the destruction of farms suspected 
of hiding saboteurs, or expelling women and 
children from their homes in order to clear the 
countryside of Boer supporters - were scarcely 
glorious or inspiring. The most notable exception 
was the rear-guard action at Leliefontein in 
November 1900. 
Major-Genera l H. Smi th-Dorr ien , 
commander of the 19th Brigade at Belfast, led 
an expedition to disperse a Boer commando 
laagered in the area of Witkloof on the Komati 
River, 200 kilometers to the south. Leaving 
Belfast on 6 November, the advancing troops 
included a section of the Royal Canadian Field 
Artillery with two 12-pounder guns commanded 
Lieutenant-Colonel François Lessard (left), 
commanding officer of the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons, with two of his lieutenants in South 
Africa. 
troops in the area, General J.C. Fourie, were 
killed, and the Boer attack lost momentum. 
Holland, Cockburn, and Turner were all later 
awarded VCs for their actions. 
Lessard has received high praise from 
historians for his role at Leliefontein. Carman 
Miller, perhaps the leading Canadian authority 
on the war, has written that, 
Lessard was superb: courageous, decisive, cool, 
and insistent, he remained with the rearguard. 
During the worst of the battle he rode along the 
ridge, keeping a general view of the engagement, 
anticipating moves, devising tactics, reassigning 
troops to shore up weak defences, making 
difficult decisions, and encouraging his men.28 
Brereton Greenhous affirms that "the column was 
saved from heavier casualties and the possible 
loss of the guns by Col. Lessard's tactical sense 
by Lieutenant E.W.B. Morrison, and about 95 
Dragoons.25 After the force reached the Witkloof 
area, the strength of the Boer forces and his own 
lack of mobility convinced Smith-Dorrien to 
return to Belfast. The following day the forces 
began to withdraw while the Dragoons and 
Morrison's guns, all under the command of 
Lessard, were left behind to cover the retreat. 
This rearguard action, which took place near a 
farm called Leliefontein, resulted in three of the 
four Canadian Victoria Crosses awarded during 
the war. 
As the Boers realized that the British were 
retiring they raced to reach the strategic ridges 
that dominated the escape route. Evans and his 
CMR played a crucial role in keeping open the 
line of retreat. As for the rearguard itself, Lessard 
ordered a staggered withdrawal, with each 
element supporting the other's movement. One 
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the battlefield coupled with his shouts to 
Morrison leave the impression, pe rhaps 
unjustified, that he did not have a grip on the 
battle."36 In Lessard's defence, it should be noted 
that many in his unit had become noticeably 
impatient with the long periods of inactivity and 
sought bolder action. Morrison remembered 
Lessard complaining in October 1900 in 
"vivacious style" that "my men, they know how 
to advance all right, but they do not know how to 
retire. You cannot get them out of a fight."37 He 
may have concluded that to order his men to 
retreat at this critical point of the battle would 
have undermined their morale, and instead he 
endeavoured to bolster their known preference 
for aggressive action. 
Reid notes that while Lessard's concern for 
maintaining good relations in his unit made him 
a popular leader, this does not necessarily mean 
that he was effective. Reid suggests that the 
decision in 1902 to name Evans, not Lessard, to 
command a later contingent of mounted troops, 
the 2nd Regiment CMR, indicates that some 
questioned Lessard's earlier performance.38 On 
the other hand, it is possible that authorities 
preferred a Westerner for this latter unit. At least 
half of its strength came from the West, and the 
governor-general, Lord Minto, had earlier 
idealized Sam Steele and the Western riders, 
while questioning the ability of the professional 
Canadian cavalry in letters to British officials.39 
It is also significant to note that Reid considers 
the RCD "the most effective Canadian unit to 
serve in South Africa, and among the best on 
either side."40 As commander, Lessard is entitled 
to share some of the credit, particularly when it 
appears that the most severe criticisms of his 
leadership seem to have come from a single 
source: Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, General 
Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia from 
1898 to 1900. 
In October 1900 Hutton, who had departed 
his position in Ottawa the previous February to 
take up a British command in South Africa, wrote 
privately to Minto that Lessard, "though 
personally brave enough, lacks confidence in 
himself in action and upon any emergency - and 
naturally fails therefore in inspiring confidence 
among those under him. He is also lacking in 
judgment."41 This opinion came a week before 
Leliefontein. The following year Hutton again 
53 
and his initiative." He added that the engagement 
had important results, as, with the death of 
Prinsloo, the number of Boer attacks on rail lines 
in the area decreased.29 
The British heaped praise and awards on the 
veterans of Leliefontein. In addition to the three 
VCs, Morrison won the Distinguished Service 
Order, and Private W. Knisley of the Dragoons 
the Distinguished Conduct Medal. The British 
may have gone somewhat overboard. Some 
members of the battalion believed that the fight 
had not been that exceptional. One Dragoon wrote 
that when the awards were announced "there was 
strong criticism made by many of the men as to 
why all of these honours had been awarded in 
the fight at Leliefontein on November 7."30 But 
certainly the Canadians had fought well, and the 
critics perhaps underestimated the consequences 
of failure by the rear guard, as well as the 
importance that the British commanders placed 
on saving guns.31 
Leliefontein was one of the Dragoons' last 
actions. Shortly afterwards they boarded ship to 
return to Canada. As their commander, Lessard 
had acquired important military experience, 
learning from problems (most notably the need 
for appropriate reinforcements of men and 
horses), and from the successes.32 Most seem to 
have appreciated his qualities. Morrison echoed 
the sentiments of others when he wrote that 
during the fight at Leliefontein "we were holding 
our own nicely on the rearguard, thanks to Col. 
Lessard's excellent disposition of his force."33 One 
officer who had served under him wrote that "as 
a soldier there was none better and we all loved 
him."34 Lessard was praised, along with his men, 
by the British Commander-in-Chief Lord 
Roberts, by Sir John French, and by Smith-
Dorrien.35 And along with most commanders of 
colonial units, he was awarded a Companionship 
of the Order of the Bath (CB). Thus one would 
expect that Lessard's experience in South Africa 
would have weighed heavily in his favour when 
command positions were being assigned for the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914. 
Praise for Lessard has not been unanimous, 
however. The historian Brian Reid has accused 
him of being overly aggressive at Leliefontein 
when positioning the guns, rattier than retreating 
more quickly. Reid adds that "his galloping about 
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Lessard's two chief critics were the Minister of the 
Militia, Sam Hughes (left, pictured in 1904), and 
Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, General Officer 
Commanding the Canadian Militia, 1898-1900. 
himself . H u g h e s w a s a very e n t h u s i a s t i c 
suppor ter of the war effort and h a d sought to 
raise his own contingent. He quarre led with 
Hut ton , who a p p r e h e n d e d "trouble" shou ld 
Hughes ever serve with British officers.44 When 
the First Contingent sailed - with Lessard listed 
as "at tached for instruct ional purposes" and 
quickly finding a place with the British - Hughes 
was "attached for passage" and not recommended 
for military service.45 After much effort,46 Hughes 
found an appointment with the British, b u t was 
soon ordered home for violating orders a n d 
publicly criticizing his superiors. The experience 
deepened his prejudice agains t professional 
soldiers - whether British or Canadian.4 7 
After t h e w a r , H u g h e s b e c a m e t h e 
Conservat ive milit ia critic a n d very clearly 
expressed his preference for the non-permanent 
active militia over the Pe rmanen t Force. When 
he became Minister of the Militia in 1911, he 
immediately began to expand the role of the 
volunteer citizen-soldier (who could cut through 
"red-tape") at the expense of the Permanent Force 
criticized Lessard 's performance, telling Minto 
t ha t when Evans was recommended for the CB 
Lessard h a d originally been recommended for 
the less prestigious C M C "It was not altogether 
an oversight for Evans is the best man," Hut ton 
explained, "but i t would never have done upon 
g rounds of expediency for Evans to have a CB 
and Lessard only a CMG." In the same letter 
Hu t ton noted t ha t a t least one Dragoon was 
critical of Lessard's leadership in crisis.42 These 
opinions, coming from such a senior figure, could 
very well have harmed Lessard's chances of being 
selected to command Canad ians in the First 
World War, a l though they do not seem to have 
been all tha t widely shared at the time that they 
were offered.43 
P r o b a b l y a n even g r e a t e r o b s t a c l e t o 
Lessard's chances , however, were the problems 
encountered in Sou th Africa by Sam Hughes 
54 
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position of command.55 But Hughes had even 
more reasons to dislike the career officer from 
the Permanent Force. 
Personalities and politics were important. 
Prime Minister Borden considered Hughes an 
able, energetic minister at times, but was 
convinced that "on matters which touch his 
insane egotism he is quite unbalanced." The 
appointment of officers was one of these matters. 
Borden regretted that Hughes's "peculiar 
methods" created so many problems during the 
initial recruitment period for the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force in August-September 1914. 
"His intense vanity and a rather vindictive temper 
which developed during this period, contributed 
to the difficulty of the situation," Borden 
remembered.56 According to his biographer, 
Hughes's preference for loyal Conservatives could 
be even stronger than his preference for Canadian 
officers over British officers.57 Nothing is known 
for certain of Lessard's politics, although the fact 
that his career prospered under the Laurier 
Liberals and stalled under the Conservatives may 
suggest an allegiance to the former party. 
Whatever the case, when Hughes began looking 
for friends and Conservatives to appoint, 
Lessard's name does not appear to have been on 
his list.58 
Hughes's animosity towards Lessard was 
confirmed during the war. He certainly made life 
difficult for Lessard during the early months of 
the conflict. In November 1914, Hughes publicly 
blasted Lessard's practice mobilization of 
Toronto militia units and the following month, 
apparently dissatisfied with Lessard's militia 
inspection service that had been established by 
order of the Governor-General, Hughes set up a 
second inspection service to override it. In both 
cases Borden sided with Lessard, as did the 
Toronto press.59 On one occasion Lessard visited 
Europe to report on the recruiting system, and 
undoubtedly took some pleasure exposing certain 
problems, such as the lack of coordination 
between Canadians, the British and the French.60 
As with a large number of Canadians, Lessard 
was becoming increasingly upset with the 
minister and stated privately: "I am out for this 
man's [Hughes's] blood. He is disgracing Canada 
and jeopardizing relations with the Imperial 
Government and the Army."61 
55 
soldiers ("bar room loafers"), whom he believed 
should be relegated to instructional roles.48 
During this period Lessard, who had become 
adjutant-general,49 the staff officer responsible for 
the organization of the forces, was equally clear 
about his support for the Permanent Force. He 
had several confrontations with the new minister, 
most notably in April 1912 when Hughes 
attempted to promote himself to the rank of 
major-general.50 
In lining up with the Permanent Force against 
Hughes, he also placed himself on the side of the 
British military establishment in Canada, which 
had concerns about the new minister's approach. 
The governor-general, the Duke of Connaught, 
for example, reported that Hughes' "treatment 
of the officers of the permanent forces has caused 
grave discontent." Hughes could hardly have been 
impressed with how famously Lessard got on 
with the British, and by the end of 1912 he had 
been replaced as adjutant-general by Hughes' 
Tory friend Victor Williams, and sent to a "lesser" 
post in Toronto, the command of Military District 
Number 2.51 
Lessard had r i sen in the mili tary 
establishment during a period in the late 19th 
century when several leaders - especially British 
professional soldiers on loan to Canada - were 
encourag ing grea te r F r e n c h - C a n a d i a n 
participation. When the war in South Africa broke 
out the call to arms clearly had greater appeal 
for anglophones, and no more than four percent 
of the 7 ,368 Canad ian volunteers were 
francophones, a percentage well below the 
proportion of French-Canadian officers in the 
C a n a d i a n con t ingen t s . Those who had 
encouraged francophones to enlist did not see 
the obstacles - most obviously the need to speak 
English, and the service's very marked pro-
English orientation. Indeed, from 1902 to 1914, 
the percentage of French-Canadian officers in the 
militia declined constantly.52 Hutton, for example, 
who as General Officer Commanding had been a 
strong proponent of a French Canadian presence 
in the Canadian militia, felt betrayed.53 Hughes, 
on the other hand, had never hidden his 
francophobia, and the South African War served 
only to intensify it.54 Some historians have seen 
Hughes's anti-French sentiments as sufficient 
reason for Lessard's not being considered for a 
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When Hughes was eventually forced to resign 
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replacement. However, he was passed over for 
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Lessard retired to live in Toronto in 1919, and 
died there in 1927. 
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